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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
This result is in harmony with the general principle, long
recognized by the courts, that a "trial" of a factual dispute
merely connotes a competent tribunal examining and determining
issues of fact in accordance with law," and therefore, may include
tribunals other than the courts.' 2 Arbitration, though informal,
ranks as a trial.13 Indeed, arbitration proceedings have received
specific statutory sanction as a means of settling controversies. 4
Particularly justifiable is the instant decision when reference
is made to the established rule emanating from the law of con-
tracts, that ambiguities in an insurance policy should be resolved
against the insurer, who drew the policy.15 Here the insurer had
undertaken specifically to indemnify the insured for any liability
which might accrue to him under the basic contract with the gen-
eral contractor. Specific reference to that contract was appended
to the policy. The contract provided for arbitration as an ex-
clusive remedy, unless waived by the adverse party. Under the
circumstances, if the insurer had prevailed, the coverage pro-
vided by the policy would have proved illusory.
Notice of Accident
Under an automobile liability insurance policy making "writ-
ten notice" of an accident "as soon as practicable" a condition
precedent to liability, the notice given must conform to the require-
ments of the policy,, concluded the Court of Appeals in Bazar v.
Great American Indemnity Co.16 Notice of an accident was not
given to the insurer until some twenty months after its occur-
rence. The manner of giving notice was as unusual as its tardi-
ness: an agent-of the insurer happened to be present when the in-
sured's husband was accused by a police officer of having been
involved in the accident.
The insured claimed that she had given notice "as soon as
practicable" since she learned of the accident in the same way and
at the same time as did the insurer's agent. No denial was made
11. Ward v. Davis, 6 How. Prac. 274 (1851); People v. Richettli, 302 N. Y. 290,
97 N. E. 2d 908 (1951).
12. Cf., People ex rel. Hunter Arms Co. v. Foster, 247 App. Div. 619, 288 N.Y.
Supp. 295 (4th Dep't 1936) ; People ex rel Myers v. Barnes, 114 N.Y. 317, 20 N. E.
609 (1889) ; Roge v. Valentine, 280 N. Y. 268, 20 N. E. 2d 751 (1939) ; Davis v. Sayer,
205 App. Div. 562, 200 N.Y. Supp. 134 (2d Dep't 1923); People ex rel. Garrilty v.
Walsh, 181 App. Div. 118, 168 N.Y. Supp. 440 (2d Dep't 1917); Plunkett v. Wilson,
179 Misc. 149, 37 N. Y. S. 2d 959 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
13. Hyman v. Pottberg's Ex'rs., 101 F. 2d 262 (2d Cir. 1939).
14. C. P. A. §§ 1448, 1459. Under C.P.A. §§ 1464, 1466, a judgment may be en-
tered on the award, and is enforceable as a judgment in an action.
15. 3 WILLISTON, CONTAC'rs § 621 (Rev. Ed. 1938); 1 COUCH, INSURANCE LAW
§188 (1929).
16. 306 N.Y. 481, 119 N.E. 2d 346 (1954).
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of the fact that the notice, even if timely, was unwritten, except
that it was argued that the applicable statute" did not require
written notice, and therefore, the policy provision, being in con-
flict with the statute, was invalid. But the court, although ex-
pressing the opinion that notice was timely under the circum-
stances, pointed out that on the basis of the legislative history of
the statute and its predecessor, and the cases interpreting the sec-
tion, Is a requirement of written notice did not contravene the
statute. I :
The insured's final argument was that the insurer's agent
bound the insurer by waiver or estoppel. But the court concluded
on the authority of the Nothhelfer case'" that a non-waiver agree-
ment in the policy was binding, and found no estoppel present,
since there was no showing that the agent had accepted the notice
as sufficient, or acted on it in any manner.
The result in the Bazar case is consonant with earlier cases,
which have held that in the absence of waiver or estoppel by the
insurer's receiving oral notice without objection and acting upon
it, a requirement of written notice is binding on the insured.20
The court's opinion that notice was timely did not affect the de-
cision, which relied on the failure to furnish notice in written
form*- but generally, and in the absence of a requirement that
notice be given "immediately" or within a specified time, the
requirement of timeliness is satisfied by the furnishing of notice
within a reasonable time after the occurrence of the accident,21
unless it appears that the insured is ignorant of the existence of
the policy.22 But ignorance of the occurrence of the accident, or
physical effects of the accident which preclude giving notice, are
not grounds for delay, although the latter rule is applied most
strictly in cases involving specific time requirements. 2
17. IisuRANcs LAw § 167 (1) (c).
18. Nothhelfer v. American Surety Co. of N. Y., 277 App. Div. 1009, 100 N.Y. S.
2d 331, aff'd, 302 N.Y. 910, 100 N.E. 2d 184 (1951); also see, Weatherwax v. Royal
Indemnity Co., 250 N.Y. 281, 165 N.E. 293 (1929), which reached the same conclusion
under the former INSuRANCE LAW § 109, identical to present § 167 with reference to
notice by the insured.
19. Supra note 18.
20. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Edwards, 122 U. S. 457 (1887) ; Farrell v. Merchants
M. A. L. Ins. Co., 203 App. Div. 118, 196 N.Y. Supp. 383 (2d Dep't 1922).
21. Brink v. Hanover F. Ins. Co., 80 N.Y. 108 (1880).
22. Treiger v. Commercial Tray. Mut. Acc. Assn., 122 Misc. 159, 202 N.Y. Supp.
410 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
23. Whiteside v. No. Amer. Acc. Inc. Co., 200 N. Y. 320, 93 N.E. 948 (1911);
Hammill v. Un. Commercial Tray., 178 App. Div. 338, 164 N.Y. Supp. 815 (3d Dep't
1917). The New York position is distinctly a minority view; see, 7 CoucH, op. cit.,
supra note 15, § 1538k. Also, it is not entirely clear that the rule applies with equal
force in both specified-time and reasonable-time situations.
